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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has appointed 
lawyers from across the country to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") and has been 
accused of ignoring the members of the D.C. Bar. For example, ·during 
Democratic presidencies Harry Truman appointed David Bazelon from 
Illinois by way of the Department of Justice, John F. Kennedy appointed 
Skelly Wright from New Orleans, and Jimmy Carter appointed Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg from Columbia Law School. Similarly, during Republi-
can presidencies Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Warren Burger from 
Minnesota by way of the Justice Department, Richard Nixon appointed 
George Mac Kinnon from the same. state, and Ronald Reagan appointed 
Stephen Williams from the University of Colorado Law School. This 
venerable, bipartisan tradition of nationwide recruitment for appoint-
ment to the D.C. Circuit has served the District and the nation well, 
yielding some of the court's and America's finest judges. 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Beth Brennan, James Conwell, 
Mark Gitenstein, Melissa Harrison, and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer 
and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this Essay, and the Harris Trust for its generous, 
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
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The practice of seeking nominees nationally to fill vacancies on the 
D.C. Circuit recently faced a serious challenge. Many members of the 
D.C. Bar, who have long opposed this practice, developed a proposal to 
change the D.C. Circuit appointment procedure. The proposal, which 
the association circulated to federal judges, the Clinton Administration, 
and bar leaders, sought the establishment of an eleven-member judicial 
selection commission. The commission would have been comprised of 
seven members named by the D.C. Bar's board of governors and four 
members, including three non-lawyers, chosen by the D.C. Delegate, 
Eleanor Holmes Norton. The commission would have compiled the 
names of at least three possible candidates and forwarded them to the 
President or to the D.C. Delegate, who would have committed in 
advance to submit a recommendation from that list. 
For the proposal to take effect, the President, the D.C. Delegate, 
and the D.C. Bar must have approved the proposal. Although the D.C. 
Delegate and the D.C. Bar apparently agreed to adopt the proposal, the 
Clinton Administration seemingly supported changes. The procedures 
finally adopted apply only to the selection of district court judges, 
United States Attorneys, and United States Marshals for the D.C. federal 
courts. Nonetheless, the proposal warrants analysis because it raised 
issues that will be perennially aired and that are critical to judicial selec-
tion for, and the future of, the D.C. Circuit. 1 
This Essay first examines the developments that led the D.C. Bar to 
draft the proposal. The Essay then critically evaluates the proposal by 
comparing it to the benefits of conducting a nationwide search for nomi-
nees to the D.C. Circuit. The Essay concludes that reliance on national 
pools is preferable and offers suggestions for future judicial selection in 
the D.C. Circuit. 
II. DEVELOPMENTS THAT LED TO THE PROPOSAL 
The events that prompted the D.C. Bar to craft the proposal deserve 
considerable treatment here.2 They enhance understanding of the propo-
sal, judicial selection for the D.C. Circuit, and the recommendations in 
l. The procedures finally adopted are reproduced in APPENDIX A. The proposal is 
reproduced in APPENDIX B. My primary purpose in this Essay is to employ the proposal as a 
surrogate for evaluating the important issues that it raises. I scrutinize the proposal's particulars 
and its mechanics, such as the commission's composition, only insofar as they implicate these 
issues. Although the procedures adopted apply primarily to appointments for the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia, this Essay only addresses appointments to the D.C. 
Circuit, because these appointments raise more difficult issues. 
2. See Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257; see 
also Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United States Senate in the 
Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 200, 202-03 (1987); David A. Strauss & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-
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the fourth section of this Essay. Although the practice of nationwide 
recruitment can be traced to the administration of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, the developments most relevant to this Essay began during 
Jimmy Carter's presidential administration. 
A. Carter Administration 
Many facets of President Carter's national judicial selection efforts 
resemble the approach that he followed in the D.C. Circuit.3 For 
instance, his administration depended less than prior administrations on 
traditional selection procedures, such as senatorial courtesy and 
patronage, by opening the process to greater public involvement and 
seeking judicial candidates from a broad, diverse pool.4 Moreover, the 
President emphasized and attained the goal of appointing highly-compe-
tent women and minorities to the appeals courts, including the D.C. 
Circuit.5 
Officials responsible for judicial recruitment emphasized the quali-
fications that were important to resolving the unusual caseload of the 
D.C. Circuit.6 These qualifications include: (1) the substantial intelli-
gence and energy needed to treat complex issues of science and technol-
ogy; (2) a compelling command of the Constitution and the separation of 
powers doctrine; (3) an understanding of the interaction between the 
branches of government and the legislative and administrative processes; 
and ( 4) a keen appreciation for the pragmatic realities of governing in 
the modem administrative state. 
The aforementioned qualifications for judicial service led officials 
to conduct nationwide searches for the finest judges, including practic-
12 (1992); see generally MARK GITENSTEIN, MAITERS OF PRINCIPLE (1992); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, 
JUDICIAL RoULEITE (1988). 
3. See W. Gary Fowler, A Comparison of Initial Recommendation Procedures: Judicial 
Selection Under Reagan and Carter, 1 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 299, 299-300, 307-09 (1983); 
Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?: Affirmative Action and Judicial 
Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 270 (1983); see also 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 1259-64 (comprehensive treatment of President Carter's national judicial 
selection efforts). 
4. See Fowler, supra note 3, at 307-09, 331; cf. O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 49-80 (discussing 
senatorial courtesy and patronage); see generally Slotnick, supra note 3, at 296-98. 
5. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 3, at 299-300, 307-09; Elliot E. Slotnick, Gender, 
Affirmative Action and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 519, 530-
35 (1984); Slotnick, supra note 3, at 271-77. When President Carter became Chief Executive only 
one woman and two African-Americans served among the ninety-seven appellate court judges, 
and only five women and twenty African-Americans or Latinos served among the 400 district 
court judges. See Robert J. Lipshutz & Douglas B. Huron, Achieving A More Representative 
Federal Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 483 (May 1979); see also Slotnick, supra note 3, at 271; see 
generally Elaine Martin, Women on the Federal Bench: A Comparative Profile, 65 JUDICATURE 
306 (1982). 
6. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
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ing attorneys within the District of Columbia, attorneys within the 
administration, and others actively involved in government. President 
Carter's Circuit Judge Nominating Commission played a significant role 
in the searches by promoting highly qualified women and minorities.7 
The Carter Administration's recruitment efforts were successful in 
realizing its judicial selection goals. President Carter's four appointees 
to the D.C. Circuit all had impeccable paper qualifications and rigorous 
practical experience that made them peculiarly well qualified to serve on 
the appeals court. 8 Each judge attended, and most taught at, prestigious 
law schools.9 
Before President Carter appointed former Chief Judge Patricia 
McGowan Wald to the D.C. Circuit in 1979, she clerked for Judge 
Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit and was the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Legislative Affairs. 10 Chief Judge Abner Mikva clerked for the 
United States Supreme Court and served in the House of Representatives 
before his appointment in 1979. ll Judge Harry Edwards was a professor 
at a number of distinguished law schools, including the University of 
Michigan Law School, Harvard Law School, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, and Duke Law School, before President Carter appointed 
him to the D.C. Circuit in 1980.12 Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a 
professor at Columbia Law School and litigated many pathbreaking gen-
der discrimination cases in the Supreme Court prior to her appointment 
in 1980.13 
When President Carter nominated and the Senate confirmed these 
7. See LARRY BERKSON & SusAN CARBON, THE UNITED STATES C1Rcurr JuDGE 
NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITs MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); see also ALAN 
NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, 
PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES (1981). These commissions were similar to the panel that the 
D.C. Bar proposed. The administration's success in placing highly-qualified women and 
minorities on the federal courts was extraordinary, because it drew candidates from a relatively 
small, comparatively inexperienced, pool of lawyers. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1262 n.18. 
8. Biographies, The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 
September 1989-August 1990, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1420-21 (1991). 
9. For example, Chief Judge Abner Mikva graduated from the University of Chicago Law 
School and taught at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, while Judge Harry Edwards 
graduated from and taught at the University of Michigan School of Law. Id. at 1420-21. 
10. Id. at 1420. Jerome Frank taught at the Yale Law School, was a leader of the Realist 
movement, and wrote the pathbreaking book LA w AND THE MODERN MIND ( 1930) before 
President Roosevelt appointed him to the Second Circuit in 1941. See generally G. EDWARD 
WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 123-28, 137-39 (1978). 
l l. Biographies, supra note 8, at 1420. 
12. Id. at 1420-21. Professor Edwards co-authored several casebooks. See, e.g., HARRY T. 
EDWARDS & JAMES J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS A 
NEGOTIATOR (1977). 
13. Biographies, supra note 8, at 1421; see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 200 
(1977) (pathbreaking Supreme Court gender discrimination case); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636, 637 (1975) (same). Judge Ginsburg's appointment to the United States Supreme Court 
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individuals, the D.C. Bar expressed no sentiment that the D.C. Circuit's 
membership be drawn from attorneys practicing in the District of 
Columbia. Indeed, numerous past presidents, the current president, and 
the president-elect of the D.C. Bar unanimously urged the Senate to con-
firm Judge Wald promptly. 14 This support for each of these nominees 
was understandable because Judge Wald was a highly-regarded long-
standing member of the D.C. Bar, and Judge Mikva was a D.C. insider 
during his tenure in the United States Congress. 15 Moreover, Judges 
Edwards and Ginsburg possessed expertise in areas such as administra-
tive practice and procedure that are important to the work of the D.C. 
Circuit. 16 
Numerous observers believe that all of these Carter appointees have 
rendered outstanding service. 17 Each judge has ably handled the com-
plex cases that are filed in the appeals court while continuing to be an 
active participant in scholarly debate. 18 Many judges and lawyers con-
sidered Judge Wald to be an innovative administrator and dedicated con-
ciliator during her half-decade tenure as Chief Judge. 19 
These views, however, are not universally held. Some conservative 
writers and politicians have criticized these appointments as affirmative 
action for the bench, intimating that the jurists were less qualified. 20 
The critics apparently disagreed with the judges' substantive decision-
makes even more compelling the issues treated in this Essay because there are now two vacancies 
on the D.C. Circuit. 
14. See Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., !st Sess. 135, 189-94 (1980) (D.C. Bar support for Judge Wald); 
Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 
96th Cong., !st Sess. 159 (1980) (D.C. Bar support for Judge Mikva); infra notes 31-40, 45-46 
and accompanying text (D.C. Bar concerns that led to development of proposal); see also Laura 
A. Kiernan, Slow Drain of Talent Continues Unabated, WASH. PosT, June 18, 1979, at Cl (D.C. 
Bar leadership urging Judge Wald's confirmation). 
15. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1420 (Judge Wald was an attorney for Neighborhood 
Legal Services Program and Center for Law and Social Policy, among other organizations); see 
also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
16. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. 
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Marshall, Tribute to Honorable Patricia M. Wald, 140 F.R.D. 491 
(1992); Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial 
Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909, 909 n.2 (1990) (tribute to Judge Ginsburg). I recognize that this is 
controversial in part because it is so difficult to assess the quality of judicial service. See Tobias, 
supra note 2, at 1262-63; cf. infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (criticizing Carter 
appointees' service). 
18. See, e.g, Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 M1cH. L. REv. 34 (1992); Patricia McGowan Wald, The "New 
Administrative Law"-With the Same Old Judges in It?, 1991 DuKE L.J. 647. 
19. See, e.g., Terry Carter, After Bork, A Rift Widens, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 1988, at 1; 
Kenneth Karpay, D.C. Circuit's Revolving Door, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 28, 1987, at 2; see also infra 
note 62 and accompanying text; see generally Patricia McGowan Wald, " ... Doctor, Lawyer, 
Merchant, Chief," 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1127 (1992). 
20. See, e.g., Selection and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearing Before the Senate 
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making and political perspectives.21 For example, some members of 
Congress even proposed legislation to modify the venue requirements so 
that there would be fewer opportunities to litigate in Washington, D.C.22 
B. Reagan Administration 
The Reagan Administration's judicial selection objectives and 
processes as well as its appointees contrasted sharply with those of Pres-
ident Carter. The Republican President stated candidly that his principal 
goal in choosing judges was to create a more conservative judiciary.23 
Thus, the Reagan Administration rejected the selection procedures of the 
Carter Administration. For instance, President Reagan eliminated Presi-
dent Carter's circuit nominating commission24 and made few efforts to 
seek out and nominate very qualified female and minority judges. 25 
President Reagan reverted to conventional procedures for choosing 
judges,26 such as relying substantially on patronage and senatorial cour-
tesy and assembling pools of candidates that were not diverse in terms of 
gender, race, or political perspectives.27 
The Reagan Administration's application of these national goals 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., lst Sess. 2-5 (1979) (statement of Senator Harry F. Byrd); 
see also Fowler, supra note 3, at 334; Slotnick, supra note 3, at 274-75. 
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 
976, 979, 999 (1982); see generally Venue Reform: Sue West, Young Man?, REGULATION, Jan./ 
Feb. 1982, at 10. 
22. See, e.g., S. 739, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 754, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
This proposal was called "Sagebrush Venue," because its advocates represented western states. 
Cf. PAUL LAXALT ET AL., NATIONAL LEGAL CTR. FOR THE Pue. INTEREST, VENUE AT THE 
CROSSROADS (Steven R. Schlesinger ed. 1982) (analysis by advocates and opponents); see also 
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 977 n.9. 
23. See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 60; Fowler, supra note 3, at 336; see also Sheldon 
Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JuDICATURE 313, 327 
(1985). 
24. See Exec. Order No. 12,059 § 4(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1978), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 44 (Supp. 1992), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,305, 46 Fed. Reg. 25,421 (1981), reprinted in 
28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1992); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text; see generally 
Slotnick, supra note 5, at 530-31. 
25. See, e.g., Elaine Martin, Gender and Judicial Selection: A Comparison of the Reagan and 
Carter Administrations, 71 JUDICATURE 136, 138-41 (1987); Carl Tobias, The Gender Gap on the 
Federal Bench, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 174 (1990); see also supra note 5 and accompanying 
text (special efforts of Carter Administration). 
26. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1266. 
27. The President and his judicial selection officials also relied on affirmative mechanisms to 
accomplish the administration's purposes. See O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 60-62; Tobias, supra 
note 2, at 1266-68. Judicial recruiters assiduously searched for candidates who held appropriately 
conservative views and submitted their names to President Reagan. For instance, these officials 
evaluated the substantive determinations of federal appellate and trial court judges to determine 
whether they should be elevated to higher tiers in the system. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the 
Kind of Judges Reagan Favored, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; Tim Weiner, White House 
Builds Courts In Its Own Image, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 7, 1990, at Al. 
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and procedures to selecting judges for the D.C. Circuit had telling 
effects. The President and personnel responsible for choosing judges 
may have stressed conservative political perspectives at the expense of 
other important qualities, such as judicial temperament. Moreover, they 
appeared to de-emphasize and ignore specialized expertise pertinent to 
the court's caseload and other qualities critical to service on the D.C. 
Circuit. 
The Reagan Administration, like the Carter Administration, relied 
on the notion of the D.C. Circuit as a national court to justify naming 
judges from a nationwide pool. The Reagan Administration, however, 
conceptualized and implemented the "national" concepts very differ-
ently than the Carter Administration. For instance, President Reagan 
selected a few academics from law schools located outside Washington, 
D.C., primarily because they had conservative credentials.28 
President Reagan apparently chose other judges because they 
worked in prior Republican administrations, were former Republican 
elected officials, or were the proteges or friends of loyal or influential 
senators. 29 Perhaps most striking, President Reagan appointed three 
individuals whose home-state senators had allegedly rejected them as 
candidates for their local circuit courts. 30 The difficulties posed by this 
conceptualization of the D.C. Circuit and this notion of national 
patronage were exacerbated by the fact that the District of Columbia had 
no politically-responsive senator to protect its interest or those of the 
D.C. Bar. 
28. These Reagan appointees were Judge Antonin Scalia and Judge Robert Bork. See 
Biographies, The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, September 1986-
August 1987, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1988) (Judge Bork); infra notes 62-64 and 
accompanying text; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: 
Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency 
Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 304 (recognizing the conservative ideology of Reagan's eight 
appointees to the D.C. Circuit). 
29. Reagan appointee James Buckley had been a Republican Senator from New York. 
Biographies, supra note 8, at 1421; see generally Confirmation Hearings on Federal 
Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 658 
(1986) (testimony of Senator Buckley) [hereinafter Buckley Hearings]. Judge David Sentelle was 
correspondingly a supporter and protege of Senator Jesse Helms. See infra note 36 and 
accompanying text; see also Biographies, supra note 8, at 1422; see generally Confirmation 
Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth 
Cong., lst Sess. 160 (1988) (testimony of Judge Sentelle) [hereinafter Sentelle Hearings]. 
30. See Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 256, 263 (1987) (statement of Paul Friedman in 
confirmation hearings for Judge Douglas Ginsburg) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearings]. The three 
nominees allegedly were Judge Buckley, Judge Kenneth Starr, and Judge Stephen Williams. See, 
e.g., id. (alleging all three judges rejected); Buckley Hearings, supra note 29, at 691-93 (statement 
of Marna Tucker, D.C. Bar Immediate Past President alleging Judge Buckley rejected); David F. 
Pike, The Court-Packing Plans, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 29, 1983, at l, 27 (alleging Judge Starr 
rejected). 
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The D.C. Bar expressed increasing concern about the appointments 
during the Reagan Presidency. For example, the D.C. Bar urged the 
Reagan Administration to nominate a member of the D.C. Bar to the seat 
that became vacant early in 1986.31 Instead, the President chose Stephen 
Williams, a Professor of Law at the University of Colorado.32 
In 1986, Paul L. Friedman became the President of the D.C. Bar 
and he commenced a campaign to assert the Bar's views. Mr. Friedman 
discussed the issue with Justice Department officials responsible for 
choosing nominees and with the Office of White House Counsel but 
apparently experienced limited success.33 Moreover, the D.C. Bar dis-
cussed the possibility of creating a committee to evaluate potential nom-
inees with local ties, to forward their names to the administration, and to 
advocate the lawyers' candidacies.34 
The Bar's concern increased when the Reagan Administration nom-
inated to the D.C. Circuit Douglas Ginsburg, a former Professor of Law 
at Harvard and the head of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment.35 This concern was compounded when the President announced 
his intention to nominate for another opening on the D.C. Circuit Dis-
trict Judge David B. Sentelle of Asheville, North Carolina, who had 
practiced exclusively in North Carolina and was a supporter and protege 
of Senator Jesse Helms.36 
Mr. Friedman testified at the confirmation hearings on Judges Gins-
burg and Sentelle and urged the Senate Judiciary Committee to support 
the D.C. Bar's position that the administration stop choosing nominees 
for the D.C. Circuit from outside the D.C. metropolitan area.37 At the 
proceedings for Judge Sentelle, Mr. Friedman stated that the D.C. Bar 
was frustrated and tired of being ignored in the selection process for the 
31. See Ruth Marcus, D.C. Bar Troubled By Outsiders, WASH. PosT, Sept. 29, 1986, at 02. 
32. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1421; see generally Confirmation Hearings on Federal 
Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 
(1987) (testimony of Judge Williams). 
33. See Marcus, supra note 31, at 02; see also Ruth Marcus, Appeals Court Nomination 
Angers D.C. Bar, WASH. PosT, Apr. 9, 1986, at 82; accord Telephone Interview with Paul 
Friedman, White & Case, Washington, O.C. (Feb. 26, 1993). 
34. See Marcus, supra note 31; accord Telephone Interview with Paul Friedman, supra note 
33. 
35. See Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 30; see generally Marcus, supra note 31. 
36. See Marcus, supra note 31, at 02 (intention to nominate); cf. Carter, supra note 19, at 44 
(Judge Sentelle political ally of Senator Helms); Ruth Marcus, North Carolina Judge is Seen as 
Choice for Appellate Vacancy Here, WASH. PosT, Sept. 27, 1986, at Al5 (same); see generally 
Sentelle Hearings, supra note 29. 
37. See Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 30, at 256-58; Sentelle Hearings, supra note 29, at 
173-75. 
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D.C. Circuit.38 The D.~. Bar President criticized President Reagan for 
not nominating any African-Americans, women or Latinos.39 He recom-
mended that the Committee consider the gender and race of appointees 
to insure that the D.C. Circuit's composition reflected the nation, the 
community, and the legal culture in which it functions.40 
Assistant Attorney General Stephen Markman, the Attorney Gen-
eral's main adviser on judicial nominations, responded to Mr. Friedman 
by stating that the Reagan Administration did not consider gender and 
race in choosing judges.41 Mr. Markman stated that "[t]his administra-
tion is committed to the idea of appointing the best qualified individual 
to a given judicial position without regard to race, color, religion or gen-
der, and that is our policy with respect to courts that are located inside 
the District of Columbia and outside the District of Columbia."42 
Mr. Markman subsequently testified before the Committee that the 
administration believed that it had no special responsibility to search for 
qualified female and minority lawyers.43 The Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral added that the administration was unwilling to consider the Dis-
trict's parochial interests and that the D.C. Circuit is a national court 
whose judges must be drawn from the entire nation.44 
Mr. Friedman continued to spearhead efforts to vindicate the D.C. 
Bar's interests by editorializing in the Washington Post during and after 
his tenure as D.C. Bar President. In a May 1987 article, Mr. Friedman 
recapitulated and elaborated his arguments, imploring the Reagan 
Administration and "those that follow to break with the irrational and 
insupportable practices of the past and look first and foremost to the 
members of our legal community for nominees to the D.C. Circuit."45 
On February 14, 1988, Mr. Friedman capitalized on the resignation of 
Judge Robert Bork to reiterate his arguments for considering candidates 
from the D.C. Bar.46 
38. See Sentelle Hearings, supra note 29, at 174; see also Ginsburg Hearings, supra note 30, 
at 258 (similar testimony). 
39. See Sentelle Hearings, supra note 29, at 173-75. 
40. Id. Other bar members testified orally or submitted written testimony on this subject in 
both the Ginsburg and Sentelle proceedings. Indeed, Marna Tucker, a predecessor of Mr. 
Friedman, briefly testified on the issue at Judge Buckley's hearing. See Buckley Hearings, supra 
note 29, at 691. 
41. Head of D. C. Bar Assails Judicial Nominations Here, WASH. PosT, Apr. 2, 1987, at A4. 
42. Id. 
43. See The Performance of the Reagan Administration in Nominating Women and Minorities 
to the Federal Bench: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 
24-28, 32-34 ( 1988). 
44. Id. at 22-24. 
45. Paul Friedman, No Local Lawyers Need Apply, WASH. PosT, May 25, 1987, at A19. 
46. See Paul Friedman, The Bork Vacancy, WASH. PosT, Feb. 14, 1988, at CS. President 
Bush eventually nominated Judge Clarence Thomas to that seat, which he assumed in 1990; see 
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The recruitment endeavors of the Reagan Administration were suc-
cessful in achieving the President's judicial selection objectives. Nearly 
all of the appointees had very strong paper qualifications, and most of 
the judges participated in rigorous practices that should have prepared 
them well for service on the D.C. Circuit. Practically every appointee 
matriculated at fine law schools, and some were faculty members at 
those institutions. Nominees Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork had held 
high-ranking policy positions in earlier Republican administrations and 
taught at elite law schools before President Reagan named them to the 
D.C. Circuit.47 Judge Kenneth Starr clerked for Chief Justice Burger 
before the President appointed him to the appeals court.48 
Several criticisms have been levelled at the Reagan Administration 
for its judicial selection efforts. Most important, critics allege that Presi-
dent Reagan did not consider gender, racial, or political diversity. He 
named eight white males, nearly all of whom shared the President's con-
servative political views.49 Almost every judge had some experience in 
the federal government, but several possessed little expertise directly rel-
evant to the D.C. Circuit's caseload.so Although some Reagan appoin-
tees have participated in scholarly exchange,s1 the Republican judges 
have been less active than their Democratic counterparts.s2 
Most of the critics' concerns are reflected in the substantive deter-
minations of the Reagan appointees. The overall decision-making of the 
D.C. Circuit became more conservative. The three-judge panels increas-
ingly split along the political party lines of the Presidents who named 
the jurists. This was especially true on highly controversial public pol-
generally Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings]. 
47. Biographies, supra note 28, at 1100 (Judge Bork). Judge Scalia was Assistant Attorney 
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, and Judge Bork was Solicitor General. Judge Scalia 
taught at the University of Chicago Law School, and Judge Bork taught at Yale Law School. 
48. See Biographies, supra note 28, at 1100; see generally Kenneth W. Starr, Assessing the 
Health of the Federal Courts, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1993, at 10. 
49. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 46, at CS (eight white males); Carter, supra note 19, at 44 
(sharing President's views); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text (President's views). 
50. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1421-22 (Judges Buckley, Sentelle, and Williams 
possessed little directly relevant expertise); see generally supra notes 29, 32, 36 and 
accompanying text. 
51. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 1008 (1991); Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association and Judicial 
Nominations, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1092 (1991). 
52. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Evidence suggests that a few Reagan 
appointees may lack other qualities, namely the judicial temperament necessary to serve on an 
appellate court. See infra notes 62-65, 84 and accompanying text; see generally Patricia M. Wald, 
Random Thoughts on a Random Process: Selecting Appellate Judges, 6 J.L. & PoL. 15, 20-21 
(1989). 
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icy issues, such as affirmative action and prison conditions.53 Similar 
divisions arose on procedural issues, particularly threshold questions 
that implicated access to the federal courts.54 For example, an analysis 
of two important standing cases of the 1987 term in which the en bane 
D.C. Circuit split evenly showed that the court had "divided on ideologi-
cal grounds."55 As Judge Mikva observed, these lawsuits "engendered 
some six separate opinions of great length and much sound and fury."56 
During the summer of 1987, the most controversial public revela-
tion of sharp disagreement on the D.C. Circuit emerged over the stan-
dard for en bane review of panel decisions.57 The new conservative 
majority of Republican judges granted en bane review ostensibly to 
reverse several determinations by the court's liberal Democratic appoin-
tees.58 This prompted Judge Laurence Silberman, a Reagan appointee, 
to join the "liberal" judges in voting to vacate the earlier decisions per-
mitting en bane review.59 Judge Edwards, writing for the majority, criti-
cized the minority for doing "substantial violence to the collegiality that 
is indispensable to judicial decisionmaking."60 Judge Starr, the only 
conservative member of the court to author a written dissent, character-
ized the determination to vacate as "destabilizing and unseemly."61 
The prominent public display in the Federal Reporter Second of 
these differences of opinion may have been symptomatic of the reduced 
collegiality on the D.C. Circuit. Such collegiality is essential to service 
on an appellate court and had apparently been dwindling. Judges Scalia 
an~ Wald, the consensus-builders, had previously maintained a modi-
53. See, e.g., Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirmative action), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (prison overcrowding). 
54. These issues include standing, ripeness, mootness, and related issues, such as attorney fee 
awards. For sharp disagreements on ripeness, see the majority, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions in Consolidated Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission, 824 
F.2d 1071, 1088, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see generally Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit Here 
and Now, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 718, 719-24 (1987); Carter, supra note 19. 
55. Glenn D. Grant, Comment, Standing on Shaky Ground, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1408, 
1408 (1989); see also Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (per 
curiam), vacated, 856 F.2d 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 
25 v. Smith, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
56. Abner J. Mikva, Strum Und Drang at the D.C. Circuit, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1063, 
1066 (1989); cf Wald, supra note 54, at 719 (noting Supreme Court's reversal of several circuit 
standing decisions as too restrictive). 
57. Bartlett v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see generally Ginsburg & Falk, supra 
note 5L 
58. Bartlett, 824 F.2d at 1242-43. 
59. Id. at 1246-47. 
60. Id. at 1243. 
61. Id. at 1253 (emphasis omitted); see generally Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc 
Review, 67 N.C. L. REv. 29 (1988). 
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cum of collegiality between liberals and conservatives.62 When Judge 
Scalia became a Supreme Court Justice, however, this consensus deteri-
orated. Moreover, little remained to moderate the forceful presence of 
Judge Robert Bork, who substantially contributed to the court's political 
polarization on controversial issues. 63 Judge Bork's bitter battle over 
confirmation to the Supreme Court and his subsequent resignation from 
the D.C. Circuit may have temporarily diffused some of the dissen-
sion.64 Nonetheless, disputes have continued and occasionally erupted 
into public controversies and confrontations. 65 
C. Bush Administration 
Federal judicial selection under the Bush Administration merits less 
examination because it resembled the approach used by the Reagan 
Administration.66 For example, President Bush adopted the same goal 
of making the federal courts more conservative67 and relied substantially 
on senatorial courtesy and patronage.68 The Bush Administration, how-
ever, changed certain features of the judicial selection procedure used by 
the Reagan Administration.69 Perhaps most important, the Bush Admin-
istration instituted special efforts to nominate women and minorities, but 
it only initiated these efforts in 1990, and they were less comprehensive 
than the Carter Administration's similar efforts.70 
The Bush Administration appointed only three judges and nomi-
nated one other person to the D.C. Circuit.71 These few individuals indi-
62. See Carter, supra note 19, at 43. 
63. Id.; see also ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); Kenneth Karpay, The 
D.C. Circuit's New Face, LEGAL TIMES, May 4, 1987, at I; see generally Pierce, supra note 28; 
Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and Figuratively Halfway 
Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 MINN. L. REV. l (1987). 
64. See BORK, supra note 63; G1TENSTEIN, supra note 2. 
65. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
66. See Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on the Judiciary: Carrying on a Tradition, 74 
JumcATURE 294 (1991); Lewis, supra note 27, at Al. 
67. See, e.g., Letter from President George Bush to Senator Robert Dole (Nov. 30, 1990) (on 
file with author); Lewis, supra note 27, at Al; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text 
(Reagan Administration goal). 
68. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
69. For example, President Bush altered his predecessor's approach to Supreme Court 
nominations by submitting "stealth" candidates. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1270-71. Mr. Bush 
also announced that he sought to name judges who would interpret the law, rather than legislate. 
See The Candidates Respond, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1988, at 52, 57; The Election: Clinton v. Bush, The 
Candidates on Legal Issues, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 57, 57; see also supra notes 23-27 and 
accompanying text (Reagan Administration approach). 
70. See, e.g., Letter from President George Bush to Senator Robert Dole, supra note 67; 
Goldman, supra note 66, at 297; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text (President Carter's 
efforts). · 
71. The judges were Judges Henderson, Randolph, and Thomas. See generally Confirmation 
Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst 
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cate that the Bush Administration chose less doctrinaire nominees for 
the court than President Reagan's nominees. Moreover, the Bush 
Administration apparently placed more emphasis on qualities important 
to service on the D.C. Circuit, especially significant government 
experience. 
President Bush and his staff, in contrast to the Reagan Administra-
tion, did not rely on the idea of the D.C. Circuit as a national court to 
justify nominations from outside the District of Columbia.72 For 
instance, appointees A. Raymond Randolph and Clarence Thomas and 
nominee John Roberts were members of President Bush's or prior 
Republican administrations,73 and Clarence Thomas and Karen LeCraft 
Henderson could be characterized as proteges or friends of senators who 
were loyal or important to PresidentBush.74 Nonetheless, A. Raymond 
Randolph and John Roberts actively practiced for most of their legal 
careers in Washington, D.C.; Clarence Thomas was a government poli-
cymaker for nearly a decade and is an African-American; and Karen 
LeCraft Henderson is a woman. 75 
In short, the Bush Administration was more attentive to the D.C. 
Bar's concerns which were expressed during the Reagan Administration. 
This more cooperative approach, the gender and racial diversity of the 
judges, and the local character of most of the nominees apparently 
explains why the D.C. Bar was less critical of the Bush Administration's 
selection policies. The choice of Judge Henderson, who seemed to have 
limited expertise relevant to the D.C. Circuit and no links with Washing-
ton, except support from a powerful Republican Senator, probably suf-
ficed to keep the issue alive.76 · 
The judicial selection efforts of the Bush Administration were sue-
Cong., 2d Sess. 447 (1991) (testimony of Judge Henderson) [hereinafter Henderson Hearings]; 
Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1991) (testimony of Judge Randolph) [hereinafter Randolph 
Hearings]. The nominee was John Roberts. See Daniel Klaidman, Bush Chooses Deputy SG for 
D.C. Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 16, 1991, at I; infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Judge 
Thomas's relatively short tenure on the Circuit also complicates this assessment. 
72. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
73. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
74. Judge Henderson was a protege of Senator Strom Thurmond, and Judge Thomas was a 
protege of Senator Danforth. See, e.g., Shoo-Ins, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 23, 1990, at 7; Lewis, supra 
note 27, at Al; see generally Henderson Hearings, supra note 71; Thomas Hearings, supra note 
46. 
75. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1422 (Judge Randolph); Klaidman, supra note 71 
(Roberts). Justice Thomas, the second appointee, headed the EEOC for eight years. See Marcia 
Coyle, Liberals Sound Alarm on D.C. Circuit Choice, NAT'L L.J., July 24, 1989, at 4; see 
generally Thomas Hearings, supra note 46. 
76. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1422 (Judge Henderson's expertise); supra note 74 
(Judge Henderson's support from Senator Thurmond). 
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cessful in attaining its judicial selection goals. Practically all of the law-
yers appointed or nominated had strong paper qualifications, and most 
had participated in challenging legal practices and graduated from excel-
lent law schools. For instance, both Judge A. Raymond Randolph and 
nominee John Roberts had served as Deputy Solicitor General,77 and 
Judge Clarence Thomas headed the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. 78 
Critics of the Bush Administration's appointments to the D.C. Cir-
cuit note the judges' lack of political diversity.79 One Bush appointee 
apparently had limited experience directly pertinent to the appeals 
court's caseload.80 Moreover, these judges have undertaken little 
scholarship. 81 
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the substantive 
decision-making of the appointees because the President elevated Judge 
Thomas to the Supreme Court, John Roberts' nomination languished in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Judges Henderson and Randolph 
were not appointed until 1990. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be 
posited by considering the court's determinations since 1990. 
The D.C. Circuit's decision-making generally has continued to be 
conservative. For example, in cases involving important issues of sub-
stantive policy and court access the circuit panels have split along the 
party lines of their respective appointing Presidents.82 Perhaps most 
prominant was the decision that overturned Colonel Oliver North's con-
viction.83 There has also been some evidence of continuing lack of col-
legiality. For example, in a tense private conference on an affirmative 
action case, Judge Silberman, angry at Judge Mikva, exclaimed: "If you 
77. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1422 (Judge Randolph); Klaidman, supra note 71 
(Roberts); see generally Randolph Hearings, supra note 71. 
78. See supra note 75. 
79. See, e.g., Klaidman, supra note 71 (Judge Thomas' conservatism); Henderson Hearings, 
supra note 71, at 447-50 (Judge Henderson's testimony indicating conservatism); see also infra 
notes 82-83 and accompanying text (D.C. Circuit's decision-making continuing to be 
conservative); see generally Saundra Torrey, Democrats Start Jockeying For Judgeships, WASH. 
PosT, Dec. 7, 1992, at F5. 
80. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1422 (Judge Henderson's apparently limited expertise 
directly pertinent to D.C. Circuit's caseload); see generally Henderson Hearings, supra note 71. 
81. These judges have produced some scholarship. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Transition 
from Policymaker to Judge-A Matter of Deference, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 441 (1993); Clarence 
Thomas, Commencement Address, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 815 (1991). 
82. See, e.g., Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (FCC minority 
distress policy), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); King v. 
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane) (attorneys fees), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 
(1992); Ayuda, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (court access), vacated, 498 
U.S. 1117 (1991); but see Wald, supra note 19, at 1146 (only one-fourth of high profile cases 
rendered by split panels between 1986 and 1991). 
83. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). 
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were 10 years younger, I'd be tempted to punch you in the nose."84 
The more moderate judicial selection policies of the Bush Adminis-
tration do not mean that the D.C. Circuit is free from the problems that 
concerned the D.C. Bar. Nevertheless, the election of President Bill 
Clinton, who may be more receptive to certain of the D.C. Bar's con-
cerns, has revived the Bar's interest in participating in the Clinton 
Administration's nominations to the D.C. Circuit. The concrete mani-
festation of this renewed interest is the D.C. Bar's development of its 
proposal for a nominating commission. The next section of this Essay 
evaluates that proposal. 
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL 
A. Introduction 
What is at stake must be clearly be identified in assessing the D.C. 
Bar's proposal to create a judicial nominating panel. It is difficult to 
challenge the principles that the maximum beneficial input would 
improve federal judicial selection and that the D.C. Bar should partici-
pate in the process of choosing judges for the D.C. Circuit. Therefore, 
the critical issues are the precise nature of the Bar's involvement, the 
appropriate weight that its input should receive, and the ramifications of 
those determinations. 
The proposal provided that the D.C. Delegate and the Executive 
Branch would commit in advance to recommend someone from slates of 
at least three candidates submitted by the D.C. Bar. 85 Therefore, for 
purposes of analyzing the proposal, I assume that President Clinton and 
his advisers would seriously consider for appointment to the D.C. Cir-
cuit those candidates forwarded by the nominating panel and that such 
treatment could correspondingly limit nationwide searches for judges. 86 
Accordingly, evaluation of the benefits of employing national pools in 
selecting nominees precedes analysis of the proposal's benefits. 
B. Benefits of a National Pool 
Numerous factors suggest that it is preferable to conduct nation-
wide searches for the best candidates to fill the vacancies on the appeals 
84. Neil A. Lewis, The 1992 Campaign: Selection of Conservative Judges Insures 
President's Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, July I, 1992, at Al3. Judge Silberman later explained that his 
statement was not a real threat because "Judge Mikva did not immediately become ten years 
younger." Id. 
85. See APPENDIX B. 
86. The administration's failure to consider the candidates seriously would be politically 
unwise. I recognize and suggest that according serious consideration to members of the D.C. Bar 
can be compatible with nationwide searches. See infra text accompanying notes 124-28. 
Nevertheless, serious consideration could well reduce reliance on the national pool. 
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court. These considerations implicate the Circuit's peculiar caseload; 
issues of gender, racial, political, and geographic diversity; pragmatic 
questions of policy and politics; and the qualifications judges must pos-
sess to serve effectively on the court. 
Many aspects of the D.C. Circuit's caseload warrant reliance on 
nationwide pools. The court's docket, although not unique, differs sig-
nificantly from the caseloads of the remaining circuit courts. Most 
appeals to the D.C. Circuit are national in several respects, particularly 
in terms of where the suits originate and the impact of the court's deci-
sions. Much of this is attributable to the District of Columbia's position 
as the seat of the federal government. 
In some statutes, Congress has specifically authorized individuals, 
who claim that the United States has harmed them anywhere in the 
country, to sue the government in Washington, D.C.87 In other statutes, 
principally social legislation such as environmental measures, Congress 
requires persons challenging certain administrative decisions to appeal 
directly from the agency to the D.C. Circuit.88 In the District of Colum-
bia, parties also institute actions involving disputes between the three 
branches of the federal government and between those branches and 
state and local governments. 
This federal inter-branch litigation includes bitter fights between 
the Congress and the Executive over raw political power, high principle, 
and questions of the respective branches' authority to act, especially in 
areas that trench on one another's power. Additional cases implicate 
disagreements over the country's most cherished symbols and sacred 
institutions, such as the flag, religion, delicate issues of national secur-
ity, the authority to dispatch troops into international combat, and even 
the prosecution of high-ranking public officials. 89 
Nearly three-quarters of the D.C. Circuit's docket comprise exceed-
ingly complex suits which seek review of federal administrative agency 
action. Many of these "cases arise under .new statutory or regulatory 
regimes," have multiple issues or parties, present novel questions and 
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988) (Social Security appeals); cf 28 U.S.C. § 2343 
(1988) (prescribing venue for review of certain agency orders in D.C. Circuit or where petitioner 
resides or has principal place of business); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988 & Supp. 1992) 
(general venue statute); see generally supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
88. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1276 (1988) (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); 42 
U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (Clean Air Act); cf 15 U.S.C. § 2060(a) (1988) 
(Consumer Product Safety Act provides for review of consumer product safety rules in D.C. 
Circuit or circuit where plaintiff resides). 
89. See, e.g., United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.) (public officials), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1003 (1989); United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (overturning 
Colonel Oliver North's conviction), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991); see also Wald, supra note 
19, at 1143-46 (describing other high-profile cases implicating issues in text). 
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innovative arguments, and are extremely complicated.90 A number of 
the actions involve cutting-edge issues of science, technology; econom-
ics, and ethics. Some of the lawsuits implicate difficult public policy 
choices about allocating scarce societal resources that Congress lacks 
either the substantive expertise or the political will to resolve.91 
Thus, most of the D.C. Circuit's caseload contrasts markedly with 
the dockets of other appeals courts. Many of the D.C. Circuit's suits 
bear little relationship to the geographic area where the court is situated 
and certain of the cases involve constitutional issues. These lawsuits, 
particularly those that seek review of federal administrative agency 
determinations, affect millions of Americans and have national and 
international ramifications. 
The lack of gender, racial, and political diversity on the D.C. Cir-
cuit favors employing nationwide searches for judicial candidates. 
These concepts are only briefly canvassed here because the propositions 
are obvious, both President Clinton and staunch advocates of the D.C. 
Bar proposal espouse the notions, and the ideas have been examined 
elsewhere.92 For example, it is. easier to enhance diversity with a pool of 
800,000 lawyers than one of 60,000. Five of the white males whom 
President Reagan appointed remain on the court, and they have reduced 
gender, racial, and political balance. President Clinton as a candidate 
stated that he would name highly-qualified women and minorities and 
less politically conservative attorneys to the federal judiciary.93 Corre-
spondingly, the presence on the D.C. Circuit of more women and minor-
ities will help their colleagues better appreciate and resolve difficult 
issues that courts increasingly confront,94 increase numerous citizens' 
confidence in the federal justice system,95 and improve conditions for 
90. Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D. C. Circuit: An Era of Change, 55 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 715, 716 (1987); see generally Pierce, supra note 28; Wald, supra note 63; Colloquy, The 
Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 507, 507-59 (1988). 
91. See, e.g., Louts L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OP ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 41-48 (1965); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 'L. REv. 1667, 
1676-81 (1975); see generally Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party 
Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745, 754-56 (1987). 
92. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 5 (examined elsewhere); Tobias, supra note 2 (same and 
President Clinton's advocacy); Carl Tobias, Closing the Gender Gap on the Federal Courts, 61 U. 
CtN. L. REv. 1237 (1993) (same); see also supra notes 39-40 (staunch advocates espouse); supra 
notes 39, 49, 53-56, 79, 82-83 (lack of diversity on D.C. Circuit). 
93. See supra notes 39, 49, 53-56 (President Reagan's appointments); The Election: Clinton 
v. Bush, The Candidates on Legal Issues, supra note 69 (President Clinton's statement); Bill 
Clinton, Judiciary Suffers Racial, Sexual Lack of Balance, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15 (same). 
94. Prominent examples are issues involving employment discrimination, such as affirmative 
action, and allocation of scarce resources. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1276 nn.101-02; see also 
Slotnick, supra note 3, at 272-73. This assistance is especially important on an appellate court 
that renders decisions in three-judge panels. 
95. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter's Judicial Nominees, 64 JumcATURE 246, 
176 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:159 
women and minorities in the legal profession and society as a whole.96 
Another aspect of the D.C. Circuit's current composition warrants 
reliance on a national pool. This is the lack of geographic diversity. For 
instance, a majority of the judges now on the D.C. Circuit served as 
federal government lawyers in Washington, D.C. before appointment.97 
There is considerable value to selecting judges who have practiced law 
or lived outside the peculiar environment of the nation's capital, associ-
ated as it is with such phenomena as politics, power, money, and 
patronage and all of their negative connotations.98 Therefore, choosing 
judges from other locales considers pragmatic political realities, espe-
cially popular distrust of the federal government. These sentiments have 
contributed to the election of every recent President. In other words, 
there could be some virtue in geographic distance from the country's 
capital. Moreover, judges on the D.C. Circuit should appreciate the 
profound effect of its decisions on Americans living and working 
outside of Washington, D.C.99 
Drawing on a national pool recognizes and capitalizes on the 
incredible wealth of legal talent that exists throughout the United States. 
A pool that includes 750,000 additional attorneys will facilitate the 
selection of candidates who best satisfy the qualifications crucial to 
membership on the D.C. Circuit. Many lawyers possess the qualities 
that are important to such service. Practitioners in every jurisdiction cer-
tainly have the intelligence, industry, independence, integrity, and tem-
perament necessary to discharge judicial duties on any federal appellate 
court. Gender, racial, and political diversity are available throughout the 
United States. 
Numerous attorneys in various locales even possess those attributes 
more peculiar to discharging the duties of D.C. Circuit judges. For 
instance, many law school faculty are experts in administrative law. 100 
253 (1978); cf. The Election: Clinton v. Bush, The Candidates on Legal Issues, supra note 69, at 
57-58 (similar suggestion by President Clinton). 
96. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 25, at 176; Carl Tobias, More Women Named Federal 
Judges, 43 FLA. L. REV. 477, 484 (1991); see generally Martin, supra note 25. 
97. Judges Edwards, Ginsburg, Henderson, Sentelle, and Williams had not served as 
government attorneys, although Judges Sentelle and Williams had been Assistant United States 
Attorneys. See Biographies, supra note 8, at 1420-22. 
98. I understand that most of these phenomena also have positive connotations and that they 
do not adequately capture work or life in Washington, D.C. or other metropolitan areas. 
99. I certainly do not intend to overstate these ideas, although the comparisons may seem 
somewhat overdrawn. I do not mean to create false dichotomies that everything in Washington is 
evil and everything outside Washington is good. Citizens in the remainder of the country, 
however, increasingly believe that they are entitled to greater representation in all segments, 
including the courts, of the federal government. 
100. Examples include Professor Christopher Edley of Harvard Law School, now serving in 
the Office of Management and Budget, and Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago 
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Competent attorneys across the country can master enormous records, 
understand complex scientific and technological issues, and competently 
review difficult public policy choices regarding allocation of scarce 
resources. When President Clinton nominated Janet Reno for the posi-
tion of Attorney General, the Chief Executive implicitly acknowledged 
many of the ideas discussed above by stating that he was honoring a 
campaign commitment to name the best from both the statehouses and 
the courthouses. 101 
C. Benefits of the Proposal 
Perhaps the foremost benefit of the D.C. Bar's proposal is the spe-
cial consideration that it accords members of the D.C. Bar in selecting 
judges for the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Bar comprises thousands of capa-
ble lawyers who are well-equipped to serve on the appeals court, and the 
Bar should be treated as an important constituent of the national pool. 102 
The D.C. Bar is undoubtedly one of the most sophisticated bars in 
the United States. It includes exceptionally competent attorneys who . 
have expertise in the types of disputes important to the D.C. Circuit's 
caseload. For instance, numerous members of the D.C. Bar have 
devoted their careers to practice before and with federal administrative 
agencies; others have actively participated in litigation involving the 
branches of the federal government, the country's most significant sym-
bols and institutions, and national security and international law. 103 
The D.C. Bar's proposal affords the possibility of increasing gen-
der, racial, and political diversity on the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Bar 
includes the most substantial group of highly-qualified female and 
minority attorneys in the nation. At least 13,000 women, 3,000 African-
Americans, and 750 Latinos practice law in Washington.104 Moreover, 
the District has the most female and minority attorneys who have earned 
partnerships in large law firms and the most women and minorities who 
Law School. See generally CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: RETHINKING 
Jumc1AL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1990); CASS R. SuNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990). 
101. "I pledged when I ran to reach beyond Washington, to bring the best from America's 
state-houses and courthouses to our government .... " Announcement ·by President Bill Clinton 
of Janet Reno as Attorney General Nominee (Federal Information Systems Corp., Federal News 
Service, Feb. 11, 1993). 
102. These lawyers possess the general qualities relating to merit and diversity and those 
qualities peculiar to service on the D.C. Circuit, such as expertise in administrative law and 
practice. 
103. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. 
104. Telephone Interview with Steve Ramirez, Office of Court Administration, D.C. Court 
System (Mar. 15, 1993); Telephone Interview with Wilbur Smallwood, Membership Director, 
D.C. Bar (Mar. 15, 1993). 
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practice in the government. 105 There are more than twenty African-
American male, ten white female, and five African-American female 
judges on the local appellate and trial courts. 106 
Insofar as the D.C. Circuit should be considered a national court, 
the "D.C. Bar is, more than that of any other jurisdiction, the most truly 
national bar, in terms of geographic representation, size, subject matter 
and impact."107 Many members of this bar consciously choose to 
become lawyers in the country's capital precisely because they want to 
engage in national practice and work on issues that affect all of the 
United States and even the world. 108 
The D.C. Circuit's docket does not consist exclusively of appeals 
from federal agency decisions and other cases that only have conse-
quences outside of Washington, D.C. The D.C. Circuit hears numerous 
civil and criminal appeals from the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia that have essentially local import. 109 The resolu-
tion of these lawsuits requires more appreciation for the practice of law 
in Washington, D.C. and for the local legal culture, concomitant knowl-
edge of the rules of evidence and of civil and criminal procedure as 
applied within the jurisdiction, and an understanding of work and life in 
the District of Columbia. 110 Local attorneys and judges will have 
greater comprehension of these phenomena than those from other 
places. 111 
105. See Friedman, supra note 46, at CS; see also Torrey, supra note 79, at F5 (D.C. Delegate 
stated "[o]ur cup runneth over with qualified lawyers, especially women and minorities."). 
106. See Telephone Interview with Steve Ramirez, supra note 104. 
107. Friedman, supra note 45, at Al9; see also Friedman, supra note 46, at CS. I am 
obviously assuming that the D.C. Circuit should be considered a national court for the purposes of 
argument. 
lOS. See Friedman, supra note 46. 
109. Sixteen percent of the appeals were criminal cases in 1992. Telephone Interview with 
Ann Pomeroy, Office of the D.C. Circuit Executive (Mar. 15, 1993). The United States Attorney 
has discretion to prosecute many criminal cases in the United States District Court or the local 
courts and typically exercises that discretion to file in District Court in high-profile cases. See, 
e.g., supra note S9 and accompanying text; see also Wald, supra note 19, at 1142 (observing that 
administrative appeals continue to dominate the court's docket but have dropped measurably since 
mid-19S0s); cf District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-35S, § 11-301, S4 Stat. 473, 476 (1970) (abrogating D.C. Circuit's jurisdiction over local, 
nonfederal cases). 
110. Of course, the evidentiary and procedural rules are supposed to be similar in all ninety-
four federal trial courts. The local rules, however, have severely eroded that concept for the civil 
rules. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, 
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (19S9); Carl Tobias, 
Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393 
(1992). 
111. These experiences range from trying exceedingly complex antitrust cases, to viewing the 
art in the National Gallery, to riding the Metro in the city that has had the highest murder rate in 
the nation. But see supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. 
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These ideas regarding knowledge of Washington, D.C. are related 
to notions of representation on that court for individuals who work or 
live in Washington, D.C. Lawyers, parties, judges, and persons who 
work or live in the District of Columbia are arguably entitled to some 
representation on the federal appellate court situated in the country's 
capital and in the national legislature. 112 
As the above factors indicate, attorneys who practice in the District 
of Columbia will possess the qualifications important for effective ser-
vice on the D.C. Circuit. Many of these lawyers will also have the intel-
ligence, industry, independence, and integrity as well as the judicial 
temperament necessary to be excellent federal appellate court judges. 
In sum, the major benefit of conducting nationwide searches for 
nominations to the D.C. Circuit is the opportunity to select the very fin-
est judges from the 800,000 attorneys throughout the country. The prin-
cipal benefit of the D.C. Bar proposal would be the heightened 
consideration that it could afford the D.C. Bar, which clearly comprises 
a valuable source of lawyers who are well-suited for service on the D.C. 
Circuit. The Bar's membership, therefore, should receive serious con-
sideration for every vacancy on the D.C. Circuit. The question that 
remains is precisely what weight the Clinton Administration should 
place on the D.C. Bar's recommendation and its proposal. The next sec-
tion suggests how the Clinton Administration should resolve those 
issues and how it should appoint new judges to the D.C. Circuit. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Introduction 
The Clinton Administration has not finalized its judicial selection 
procedures. The delayed appointment of Janet Reno as Attorney Gen-
eral slowed institution of an appointment procedure. Moreover, Presi-
dent Clinton has made few public pronouncements about the goals or 
procedures that he intends to implement. 113 Nonetheless, administration 
112. A number of these propositions lead to the question of statehood for the District of 
Columbia, which would partially respond to the concerns of the D.C. Bar that engendered 
development of its proposal. See supra notes 28-46. Statehood would enable residents of the 
District to elect a senator who would have the ability to protect the interests of both the D.C. Bar 
and the people who live and work in the district when attorneys are nominated to the D.C. Circuit. 
The issue of Washington, D.C. statehood is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Philip 
G. Schrag, The Future of District of Columbia Home Rule, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 311 (1990); 
Philip G. Schrag, By the People: The Political Dynamics of a Constitutional Convention, 72 GEO. 
L.J. 819 (1984); Louis M. Seidman, The Preconditions For Home Rule, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 
(1990). 
113. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (President Clinton's pledges); see also Michael 
York, Clout Sought in Choosing U.S. Judges, WASH. PosT, Feb. 5, 1993, at D3 (Clinton 
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officials in the Office of White House Counsel and at the Justice Depart-
ment have undertaken some planning for judicial selection, and Janet 
Reno may be receptive to the idea of nominating panels because Florida 
employs similar commissions. 114 
It appears that the Clinton Administration will retain primary 
responsibility for choosing appointees to all of the appellate courts, 
including the D.C. Circuit. For each opening, the administration proba-
bly will compile a small group of potential nominees; it may request 
input on these attorneys, and perhaps consider the submission of addi-
tional candidates, from several sources. The most important sources are 
likely to be Democratic senators and other elected officials who repre-
sent the relevant geographic areas and state and local bar associations. 115 
The Clinton Administration has not yet indicated whether it will revital-
ize the circuit nominating commission that President Carter instituted 
and his Republican successors dismantled. 116 In choosing district 
judges, by comparison, the new administration plans to defer to senators 
from those regions where the judges will sit. 117 
B. Judicial Selection for the D.C. Circuit 
When proposing nominees for vacancies on the D.C. Circuit, Presi-
dent Clinton and his advisers should apply the criteria relating to merit 
and diversity that they are employing for other appellate court vacancies. 
The Clinton Administration should also consider qualifications that meet 
the peculiar needs of the D.C. Circuit. 
In considering merit, President Clinton should name those lawyers 
whose records of achievement promise that they will be excellent 
judges. For example, the attorneys should be very intelligent, highly 
industrious, possess great integrity and significant independence, and 
Administration signaling that it intends to give deference to Democratic senators in district court 
judicial selection). 
114. Ronald Klain of the White House Counsel's Office has major responsibility for judicial 
selection, and that office has assumed greater responsibility than the Justice Department to date. 
This situation may change if Janet Reno wishes the Department to assume greater responsibility. 
Telephone Interview with Mark H. Tuohey, III, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Washington, D.C., 
and D.C. Bar President-Elect (Feb. 27, 1993) (Janet Reno's possible receptivity to commissions). 
115. See York, supra note 113, at D3 (Democratic senators, or representatives if no senators); 
cf. Torrey, supra note 79, at F5 (D.C. Delegate hoping to have analogous input). 
116. The administration has simply made no affirmative decision favoring or rejecting 
revitalization. Of course, the D.C. Bar's proposal could serve as a valuable experiment in 
revitalization, and the panel created is now doing so for the district court. See supra note 24 and 
accompanying text (dismantling by Reagan Administration of Carter panel); Tobias, supra note 2, 
at 1270-74 (Bush Administration failure to revive panel). 
117. Telephone Interview with George Kassouf, Alliance for Justice, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 
25, 1993); see also York, supra note 113, at D3. 
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evince balanced dispositions. 118 When· considering gender, racial, and 
political diversity, the President should analyze the present composition 
of the D.C. Circuit to determine whether the court might be differently 
constituted. 
The administration should honor President Clinton's campaign 
promise to increase balance on the judiciary. For instance, the diverse 
perspectives, especially from life experiences, that female and minority 
judges will bring to the appellate court may improve substantive deter-
minations.119 The appointment of more women and minorities would 
also increase public confidence in the federal courts. 120 Enhanced polit-
ical balance may correspondingly lead to judicial decisions that are more 
responsive to individuals' constitutional rights and to congressional 
intent-for example, that judges facilitate court access for resource-poor 
litigants. 121 
President Clinton and his advisers should be sensitive to the court's 
unusual docket and the expertise required to resolve that caseload. 
When treating the Circuit's current composition, the Clinton Adminis-
tration should address the lack of gender, racial, and political diversity 
on the appeals court. The administration should also consider the appar-
ent decline in collegiality among the judges on the D.C. Circuit. 122 
Although this consideration would ordinarily be less important than 
others, collegiality has seemingly decreased enough to warrant empha-
sizing characteristics, such as judicial temperament, consensus-building, 
and conciliation. 123 
All of the above factors indicate that the administration must seek 
nominees from the broadest available pool, the 800,000 lawyers 
throughout the nation. President Clinton and his advisers should con-
118. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1274-75 (more discussion of merit). 
119. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
120. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
121. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1277-78, 1278 n.108 (political diversity and decisions 
responsive to rights and to congressional intent); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural 
Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801 (1992) (congressional intent expressed in substantive, 
procedural, and fee-shifting statutes); see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme 
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing current debate 
over statutory interpretation); Wald, supra note 54, at 724-28 (statutory interpretation of the D.C. 
Circuit). 
122. See supra notes 62-65, 84 and accompanying text. 
123. Although increased diversity, especially politically, may ameliorate the decreased 
collegiality, some of the decreased collegiality may be the inevitable by-product of the very 
different judicial selection practices that Democratic and Republican administrations 
implemented. Indeed, one of the most difficult questions that President Clinton must confront is 
how to address political diversity on the courts. See, e.g., Stephen Carter, Judge Selection: 
Keeping Politics Out; Let's Fess Up to What's Been Going On, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 27. 
For helpful analysis of this issue, see GITENSTEIN, supra note 2; Wald, supra note 52; Jeff Rosen, 
Court Test: Clinton's Opportunity, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1992, at 15. 
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duct national searches for outstanding attorneys whose abilities are best-
suited to the D.C. Circuit's needs and reject the notions of nationwide 
patronage and senatorial courtesy. 124 
This approach is intended to be compatible with the D.C. Bar pro-
posal because attorneys who practice in the District should be consid-
ered as valuable constituents of the national pool. Nationwide searches 
may lead to the D.C. Bar because it includes lawyers who satisfy all of 
the applicable indicia of merit and possess expertise that is particularly 
relevant to the D.C. Circuit's caseload. Many D.C. Bar attorneys are 
women and minorities with a broad range of political perspectives. 
Thus, just as it would have been a mistake for the country and the Dis-
trict to lose the remarkable abilities of Harold Leventhal or Patricia 
Wald because they practiced locally, so too would it have been unfortu-
nate to lose the gifts of David Bazelon, Warren Burger, or Harry 
Edwards because they were not practicing in Washington, D.C. 125 
President Clinton and the D.C. Bar could implement the suggested 
approach in numerous ways. The administration officials responsible 
for judicial selection should seek input from the D.C. Bar and the D.C. 
Delegate. 126 The officials should encourage the bar association and the 
delegate to search for, find, and foster the candidacies of the ablest law-
yers who possess the attributes delineated above. 127 The bar and the 
D.C. Delegate should institute mechanisms that will efficiently yield the 
finest attorneys. For instance, the bar and the delegate should submit 
lists of candidates that are sufficiently short to be manageable yet long 
enough, in terms of satisfying the requisite criteria of merit and diver-
sity, to afford the administration adequate flexibility in choosing 
nominees. 
The Clinton Administration, through the White House and the Jus-
tice Department, should also recruit the best candidates nationally by 
applying the same criteria. The administration should then seriously 
consider the names that the D.C. Bar and the D.C. Delegate tender, 
124. See supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying notes 
98-101. Whatever judicial selection criteria the Clinton Administration applies, 750,000 
additional lawyers will invariably enhance the quality of the pool. 
125. See, e.g., In Memory of Judge Harold Leventhal, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 879-893 (1980); 
Marilyn Berger, David Baze/on Dies at 83; Jurist Had Wide Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, 
at.A38 (obituary). 
126. The bar and the delegate are the only official participants envisioned under the bar 
proposal in APPENDIX B. It may be advisable to consult other local sources, such as African-
American political organizations or women's groups, although the D.C. Delegate probably 
maintains excellent communications with such entities. The procedures actually adopted require 
such consultation. See APPENDIX A at art. IV. 
127. See supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text. 
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solicit their input on national candidates, and select the ablest attorneys 
for nomination to the D.C. Circuit. 
This manner of proceeding contemplates that the Clinton Adminis-
tration will carefully safeguard its own prerogatives to search nationally 
while seriously considering the lawyers forwarded by the D.C. Bar and 
the D.C. Delegate. It should not treat those names as binding or even 
give them presumptive weight. The administration should take this 
course of action, even though the proposal envisioned that the Executive 
Branch and the D.C. Delegate would commit in advance to draw their 
nominees from the D.C. Bar's list. 128 Some observers have argued that 
the administration should accord those recommendations persuasive 
effect. 129 The administration, however, should resist pressure to limit its 
appointments to local lawyers and defend its choices when there are 
multiple, highly qualified candidates. In short, the Clinton Administra-
tion, the D.C. Bar, and the D.C. Delegate must work closely together to 
nominate the finest judges. 
V.· CONCLUSION 
The D.C. Bar's development of a proposal for treating appoint-
ments to the D.C. Circuit affords a valuable opportunity to reevaluate 
the selection process. This analysis indicates that President Clinton 
should conduct nationwide searches for vacancies on the D.C. Circuit 
and seriously consider members of the D.C. Bar. If the new administra-
tion implements these suggestions, it will name the best judges to the 
second most important court in the country. 
128. See APPENDIX B. 
129. See York, supra note 113 (statement of D.C. Bar President Jamie Gorelick); Telephone 
Interview with Mark H. Tuohey, III, supra note 114 (similar statement of D.C. Bar President-
Elect). 
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APPENDIX A 
BY-LAWS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA FEDERAL JUDI.CIAL NOMINATING 
COMMISSION 
ARTICLE I. DEFINITIONS 
Unless it shall appear otherwise from the context, terms shall have 
the following meaning: 
Commission. The District of Columbia Federal Judicial Nominat-
ing Commission. 
Chair. The Chair of the Commission. 
Commissioner. Any member of the Commission. 
Applicant. Any person whose name has been submitted to the 
Commission as a possible nominee to fill a U.S. Attorney, U.S. 
Marshal or U.S. District Court vacancy. 
Congresswoman. The Congresswoman from the District of 
Columbia. 
ARTICLE II. PURPOSES 
The purposes of the Commission are to assist in the selection of 
candidates for federal judicial and law enforcement appointments, 
including U.S. District Court Judge, U.S. Attorney and U.S. Marshal; to 
review, investigate and evaluate Applicants; and to recommend to the 
Congresswoman names to fill each vacancy. 
ARTICLE III. MEMBERSHIP 
Section 1. · Number and Appointment. The Commission shall con-
sist of seventeen (17) members including the Chair, who shall be 
appointed by the Congresswoman. 
Section 2. Term of Office. Commissioners shall serve staggered 
terms. In order to create staggered terms which will ensure continuity 
yet allow an orderly turnover and broad community representation, ini-
tially eight Commissioners shall serve for one year and nine shall serve 
for two years. Commissioners may be reappointed. Vacancies shall be 
filled by the Congresswoman. Commissioners whose terms have 
expired shall continue to serve until a successor is appointed. 
ARTICLE IV. NOTICE OF VACANCIES 
Section 1. Notices. Whenever a vacancy occurs for U.S. District 
Court Judge, U.S. Attorney or U.S. Marshal, the Commission shall 
announce the vacancy by public notice sent to daily and other local legal 
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publications, other print and broadcast media, bar associations including 
women's, ethnic, gay and lesbian bar groups, law schools and other 
interested parties within the District of Columbia. The notice shall spec-
ify the time within which interested Applicants may apply in writing to 
the Commission. 
Section 2. Encouraging Applications. Commissioners may 
encourage individuals to submit applications, provided that it is made 
clear that such encouragement in no way constitutes endorsement. 
ARTICLE V. APPLICATION PROCESS 
Section 1. Questionnaires. A written Applicant questionnaire must 
be completed by all Applicants for each position. 
Section 2. Submittal. Applicants shall complete and submit ques-
tionnaires to the Congresswoman's office. The application shall be for-
warded to the Commission Chair. The Congresswoman's office will 
send questionnaires to all interested Applicants, including those who 
have expressed in writing an interest in applying to fill a vacancy before 
such vacancy existed or the Commission was established. 
ARTICLE VI. SELECTION CRITERIA AND SCREENING 
PROCESS 
Section 1. Selection Criteria. There shall be written criteria 
adopted by the Commission for the evaluation of candidates. These 
shall include, but not be limited to the following personal and profes-
sional qualities: integrity, legal or law enforcement knowledge and abil-
ity, judicial temperament or other professional qualities, diligence, good 
health, appropriate management skills, decision making ability, and 
social responsibility. 
Section 2. Screening Process. Commissioners shall attempt to 
elicit from Applicants information pertaining to the adopted selection 
criteria. Such screening may include, but not be limited to, review of 
written materials submitted by the Applicant or by others about the 
Applicant, interview of the Applicant and others familiar with the Appli-
cant, consultation with government agencies, results of investigations 
and review of relevant information gathered from whatever source. 
ARTICLE VII. VOTING FOR NOMINEES 
Section 1. General Procedure. Following interviews of Applicants 
for a vacancy and subsequent discussion by the Commission, the Com-
mission shall vote on individuals for each vacancy to recommend to the 
Congresswoman. The Commission shall not recommend to the Con-
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gresswoman the name of any individual who did not have the support of 
a majority of the Commission. Generally, the Commission shall recom-
mend three or more persons and more if requested by the Congress-
woman for each vacancy, and may recommend more or fewer depending 
on the number of highly qualified Applicants who receive the support of 
a majority of the Commission. The Chair shall be entitled to vote. A 
quorum consisting of a majority of the Commissioners is required for 
any vote to be taken. 
Section 2. Proxy Voting. Proxy voting shall be permitted for Com-
missioners unable to attend. Proxies must be in writing and received by 
the Chair prior to the vote and must designate the specific candidates for 
whom a favorable or unfavorable vote is to be cast. No general delega-
tion of proxy is permitted. Proxies will remain valid as long as the can-
didate for whom the proxy vote is cast remains under consideration. 
Section 3. Further Investigation. The Congresswoman may submit 
to the United States Department of Justice for executive branch investi-
gation any or all of the names for any vacancy submitted by the Com-
mission and may consider the results of any such investigation prior to 
making a final recommendation to the President. The final recommen-
dation shall be announced by the Congresswoman. 
ARTICLE VIII. ACTION AND COMMISSION . 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following selection of the most qualified nominees for a vacancy 
by the Commission, the Chair shall submit those names in alphabetical 
order to the Congresswoman. All documents and nominee information 
also shall be forwarded to the Congresswoman. If none of the names is 
acceptable to the Congresswoman, she shall return the list to the Com-
mission and request additional names. 
If an appointment is not accepted by the President or not confirmed 
by the Senate, the Congresswoman may make another selection for that 
vacancy from among the Commission's recommendations or may reo-
pen the application process for that vacancy. 
ARTICLE IX. COMMISSIONER ETHICS AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Section 1. Confidentiality. The Commission will not be able to get 
the confidence of the President, the Congresswoman and the public 
unless it operates with strict confidentiality. Commission proceedings 
are not public hearings, but are confidential personnel deliberations 
ancillary to Congressional offices and therefore not subject to the Free-
dom of Information Act. Only Commissioners, the Congresswoman and 
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her staff shall be entitled to know the names of all Applicants or final-
ists. Communications regarding Applicants shall not be made available 
to the public by the Commission. Confidential~ty is essential to the 
integrity and thoroughness of the Commission's work, such that 
revealing internal discussions of the Commission's work may be cause 
for a Commissioner to be relieved of further participation. 
Section 2. Recusals. In instances where Commissioners are related 
(professionally or personally) to Applicants, this fact shall be disclosed 
to the Chair and, if the Commissioner and the Chair conclude that the 
Commissioner should not be recused from all votes and interviews for 
the vacancy for which the Commissioner's conflict arises, the existence 
of the potential conflict shall be disclosed to the entire Commission. 
The decision of the Chair not to recuse may be overruled by a majority 
vote of the remaining Commissioners. 
Section 3. Other Ethical Considerations. In the performance of 
their duties, Commissioners shall be mindful that they hold positions of 
public trust. No Commissioner should conduct herself or himself in a 
manner which reflects discredit upon the selection process or discloses 
partisanship or partiality in the consideration of nominees. Considera-
tion of nominees should be made impartially, discreetly and objectively. 
Section 4. Disclosure of Communications with Respect to Appli-
cants. Each Commissioner shall disclose to every other Commissioner 
any written or oral communication she or he has with any non-Commis-
sioner if such communication related to an Applicant's qualifications or 
fitness to fill a vacancy. 
Section 5. Removal. A Commissioner who violates the confidenti-
ality requirement, fails to disclose to the Commissioners communica-
tions with respect to an Applicant, or conducts himself or herself in a 
manner which violates the public trust or is "at odds" with the By-laws 
may be relieved from further duty by the Congresswoman. 
Section 6. Former Commissioner as Applicant. No Commissioner 
may be considered as an Applicant for any position unless at least two 
years have elapsed since the last day of service of such Commissioner 
on the Commission. 
ARTICLE X. COMMUNICATIONS AND OUTREACH 
Section 1. Commission Comment to Media. Only the Chair may 
comment on behalf of the Commission to the media and others, and 
solicitations for comment should be referred to the Chair. Comment 
about individual Applicants may be made only by the Congresswoman. 
Section 2. Commission Meeting with Congresswoman. The Com-
mission shall meet at least once annually with the Congresswoman to 
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review procedures and suggestions for possible reforms in the selection 
process. For other purposes, the Commission shall meet on the call of 
the Congresswoman or the Chair. 
Section 3. Bar Association Investigations. The Commission may 
call upon bar and other sources as needed to assist in its investigation. If 
such sources wish to interview the Applicant, the Commission Chair 
will so inform the Applicant. Engaging in such interviews will be solely 
at the Applicant's discretion. 
ARTICLE XI. EVALUATIVE CRITERIA 
In evaluating candidates, the Commission shall consider, but not be lim-
ited by, the criteria stated below. 
Section 1. Judges. Judges shall be evaluated primarily on these 
qualities: 
a. Integrity-intellectual honesty, moral vigor and professional 
uprightness. 
b. Professional skills and experience-broad knowledge of the 
law and substantive legal and legally relevant experience. 
c. Impartiality-the ability to treat cases objectively regardless of 
the identity of the parties or subject matter in controversy. 
d. Industry-a diligent and energetic worker. 
e. Good health. 
f. High respect in the legal and local community. 
g. Respect for the Bill of Rights and for the rights of all litigants, 
entities and parties before the court. 
h. Judicial temperament-dignity, sensitivity and understanding. 
i. Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing. 
J. Demonstrated commitment to equal justice. 
k. Decisiveness-the ability to make difficult decisions quickly 
and with firmness. 
Section 2. United States Attorneys. U.S. Attorneys shall be evalu-
ated primarily on these factors: 
a. Integrity-intellectual honesty, moral vigor and professional 
uprightness. 
b. Professional skills and experience-broad knowledge of the 
law and substantive legal and legally relevant experience. 
c. A background and experience indicating the ability to make 
official decisions independent of extraneous factors and within the gen-
eral guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
d. Demonstrated administrative and management ability. 
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e. Willingness to support and carry out the policies of the Presi-
dent and to accept direction from the Attorney General. 
f. High respect in the legal and local community. 
g. Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing. 
h. Demonstrated commitment to equal justice. 
Section 3. United States Marshals. U.S. Marshals shall be evalu-
ated primarily on these factors: 
a. Integrity-intellectual honesty, moral vigor and professional 
uprightness. 
b. Knowledge and experience in applying effective preventative 
and corrective security. 
c. Demonstrated administrative and budgetary ability. 
d. Ability to work effectively and tactfully with individuals and 
groups representing widely diverse background, interests and points of 
view. 
e. High respect in the community and among members of the law 
enforcement profession. 
f. Ability to communicate effectively orally and in writing. 
g. Respect for the rights of all individuals, entities and parties 
who may come in contact with the office or judicial system. 
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APPENDIX B 
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE D.C. 
BAR RECOMMENDATION FOR NOMINATING 
COMMISSION FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 
February 1993 
UST OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: The practice of selecting federal 
judicial candidates for both the Circuit Court and the District Court in 
the District of Columbia by use of a nomination commission should be 
reinstituted. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: The Commission should recom-
mend a slate of candidates either to the executive branch or to the 
elected delegate from the District of Columbia to Congress, who should 
commit in advance to make a recommendation for the judicial vacancy 
from the list. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 3: The composition and method of 
selection of the Commission should be as follows: 
(a) The Commission should have 11 members. 
(b) Seven lawyers members should be designated by the Board of 
Governors of the D.C. Bar. 
(c) The remaining four members, at least three of whom should be 
lay persons, should be designated by the elected Delegate from the Dis-
trict of Columbia to Congress, after receiving recommendations from the 
Citizen's Advisory Committee of the D.C. Bar and other appropriate 
groups. 
( d) The Chair of the Commission should be designated from 
among the 11 members by the Elected Delegate from the District of 
Columbia to Congress. 
(e) Members should be appointed for five-year terms, with stag-
gered terms at the outset to provide continuity. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 4: Adequate representation for 
women and minority groups must be assured in the Commission's com-
position, both for lawyer and lay members. 
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RECOMMENDATION NO. 5: The members of the Commission 
should be chosen without regard to political party affiliation. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 6: The Commission should recom-
mend at least three candidates for each judicial vacancy. 
RECOMMENDATION NO. 7: The lawyer members of the Com-
mission should be active members of the D.C. Bar and either reside in 
the District of Columbia or have substantial professional ties to the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 
